Brit-Am Ephraimite Forum no. 52
Brit-Am Ephraimite Discussion. News and Issues concerning the Lost Ten Tribes and Judah in the World Today.

For Previous issues see:
Ephraimite Forum Archives





 Ephraimite 
 Forum 
        
 no.52 

rose
The Brit-Am Rose
Official Symbol of Brit-Am




Ephraimite Forum-52
Date: 11/April/08 6th Nissan 5768
Contents:
1. English National Character: Extracts from a Book Review
2. Interesting Article on Syrian Jews in Brooklyn, New York
3.
Condoleeza Rice Oil Tank Picture- A Fake?

Site Contents by Subject Home
Research
Revelation
Reconciliation
Books
Magazine
Publications
Site Map
Contents in Alphabetical Order
Search
This Site


1. English National Character: Extracts from a Book Review

H-NET BOOK REVIEW
Published by H-Albion@h-net.msu.edu (April 2008)

Peter Mandler. _The English National Character: The History of an Idea from
Edmund Burke to Tony Blair?_. New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
2006. x + 348 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. $35.00 (cloth), ISBN
0-300-12052-4.

Reviewed by Eric G. E. Zuelow, Department of History, West Liberty State
College

Extracts:
Uncovering the English National Character

A "chicken or the egg" question hangs over the study of nations, nationalism, and national identity.  Did nations come before nationalism or the other way around?  Once asked, this query immediately generates still more equally vexing problems.  How can one identify the presence of a nation?  Is it enough to find national consciousness among social elites or is it critical to find broad support among the masses?  Is it necessary for historical actors to use the term "nation" or are words such as "kingdom" acceptable substitutes that ultimately meant the same thing?[1] These are not merely historical questions and quickly involve anthropological, sociological, philosophical, and linguistic concerns.  With almost as many definitions of and ideas about nations as there are studies, most scholarly treatments speak past one another, further confusing issues that need no more obfuscation.

According to Mandler, national character is a modern idea, little more than 200 years old.  During much of the Middle Ages, collective identities were based largely on the king: the king personified the people.  By the fifteenth century "Englishness" was beginning to appear as a concept that was usually tied to admiration of English laws and institutions.  Without the widespread use of print language, however, there was little room for a vernacular of character.

By the seventeenth century new theories of historical origins provided the English with "more sharply national" qualities (p. 12), but intellectuals did not outline a firm notion of English character, with the nation as a centerpiece of analysis, until the Enlightenment.  In the mid-eighteenth century thinkers such as Baron de Montesquieu posited the idea that geography and climate might define a people's characteristics.  Soon intellectuals such as Adam Smith, David Hume, and Edmund Burke started to apply similar ideas to the English. According to Mandler, Burke's contribution to this burgeoning dialogue was especially important.  The Dublin-born philosopher and politician wrote about an English inheritance, arguing that English history reflected a continuity of character across time--a character that helped explain the powerful democratic institutions that define political life in England.  For Burke, institutions, English law and parliament in particular, along with the governing classes, exemplified Englishness.  England was the pinnacle of civilization, its people the creators of something great who enjoyed an obligation to encourage others to follow them.

As time passed, the idea of England as a "mongrel nation" that benefited from both Saxon and Celtic traits gradually eclipsed the civilizational model.  Confidence in the union was at a peak and the idea of the mongrel nation made it possible to acknowledge English dominance in Britain while also recognizing the contributions of both the Scots and even the Irish. When combined, the strengths of each group helped explain why Britain was the dominant world power.  Both reason and emotion were joined, creating a genuinely balanced people (pp. 66-67).

In contrast to the "mongrel nation idea," based more on environment than race, racial explanations of English character gained popularity during the 1850s and 1860s.  If the English were superior, as their burgeoning empire suggested to contemporaries, then it was necessary to fully explain why. Further, the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 and the Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865 both "stirred up English anger against the 'ingratitude' of fractious colonial subjects and English doubts about their capacity for civilization" (p. 72). What made these people behave so poorly while the English behaved so well?> For many, race seemed an obvious answer, but this response took various forms. There were those such as J. C. Prichard who felt that humanity formed a single species and that differences were superficial.  Meanwhile, polygenist thinkers held that each race represented a distinct species.  In contrast to both, Lamarckian thinkers argued that the races started out closely related and subsequently, due to environmental factors, diverged.

Here again, the idea of English national character remained far from fixed. Even as racialist thought sought to produce a more scientific explanation of difference, Charles Darwin's _Origin of the Species_ (1859) problematized racial explanations by dramatically expanding the historical timeline that most racialists used.  For Darwin, species evolved over thousands of years, yet England was settled and had evolved quite recently.  How could racial divergence explain changes that must have occurred in hundreds rather than thousands of years? As a result, many became obsessed with Teutonic explanations for English character.  Between the rise of Napoleon III and his defeat by the Germans in 1870, English hostility toward France and affection for Germany reached its peak.  In the context of the time, it made sense to celebrate England's Anglo-Saxon origins and to point toward popular ideas about an ancient "Saxon constitution" which bordered on proto-democracy (p. 87).  Teutonic strength produced England's great institutions and empire.

Like its antecedents, Teutonism could not last.  German unification and the subsequent development of German imperialism made it difficult to celebrate Germanic roots.  Likewise, the traumatic impact of the Boer War made celebrating imperialist exploits equally troubling.  By the early twentieth century, the new view of England was a "'Merrie England' of lords and peasants, cakes and ale, folk song and pageantry" (p. 139).  England was no longer a place of bluster, but a place of peace.  The English increasingly celebrated their ability to "muddle through" crises (p. 138), while returning to their peaceful ways immediately afterward.  By the end of the First World War, the old racialist conception of England was popular only among a small minority, while the English were increasingly seen in terms of a character type: the "Little Man"--complete with a bowler hat, bow tie, and tightly furled umbrella.  The Little Man was "small, kindly, bewildered, modest, obstinate and very lovable" (p. 163).  While previously considered dower, in the wake of World War I, the English imagined themselves to have a sense of humor and to be especially kind to animals.

Yet national character remained far from fixed.  During the Second World War, the Little Man view came under attack.  It was not that critics necessarily disliked the Little Man, but rather that this "quintessentially English" characteristic caused people to be absorbed in home life and kept them "pottering in the garden" when they should have been tuned into world events.  As A. J. Cummings wrote of his countrymen: "they were prepared to present half the world to Herr Hitler on a silver salver if only he would leave them to their own agreeable and prosperous devices, to their motor cars, their cinemas, their bungalows, their holidays at the seaside, their multiple shops, to all the congenial paraphernalia of a thriving and developing trade" (p. 185).  Even during Britain's darkest hour, however, not everybody could begrudge the English national character.  Yes, they were asleep at the wheel during the 1930s, but once the crisis was on, the English rose to the occasion.  This ability to face adversity was soon integrated into the national character.

After the war, the English celebrated their character at the Festival of Britain and looked forward to a return to normalcy--but normalcy did not last.  The splintering of popular culture during the 1960s, the economic troubles of the 1970s, and Margaret Thatcher's failure to reignite belief in the national character all served to undermine the idea.  For many, England was best exemplified by the past.  Heritage centers and museums sprung up everywhere, prompting some to wonder whether England was about to become little more than a heritage museum.  English national character seemed quaint, hardly indicative of a people who were more diverse than ever before.

While too recent for inclusion in Mandler's book, Gordon Brown's effort to develop a "'statement of values' defining what it means to be British" represents only the latest stage in this long-running dialogue.  In an age of "England after Character," (pp. 196-242) Mandler's readers should be little surprised that the government faces a difficult road toward finding such a statement.  In an age of speedy communication and transportation, emigration and diversity, the concept of English national character today inspires little more than cynicism.  For example, _Times of London_ readers replied to a motto-writing contest with phrases such as "Dipso, Fatso, Bingo, Asbo, Tesco," "Once Mighty Empire, Slightly Used," "We Apologize for the Inconvenience," and, most popular of all, "No Motto Please, We're British."  Evidently the latest debate about national character is whether it is desirable to attempt any definition of that character at all.  As one motto-writer put it, "this idea of a statement of Britishness; I cannot think of anything less British than that."[2] If Mandler's book suggests anything about what to expect in the future, however, it is that the debate about character will continue, even if cynicism about character represents the new character.

_The English National Character_ is an excellent book, full of gradations, anecdote, and intriguing arguments... First, Mandler makes clear that English national character is a modern idea.  He will undoubtedly find disagreement among both early modernists and medievalists.  Sociologist Liah Greenfeld, for example, cites John Milton's belief that liberty was "the distinguishing characteristic of Englishness,"[3] a view not terribly different from that of Burke, Smith, and Hume some 150 years later.  Was Milton ahead of his time or was he responding to a larger dialogue about what marked the English as different from their continental neighbors?
Second, _The English National Character_ is likely to prompt objections from scholars concerned with ordinary people as opposed to social and political elites.  Although Mandler does briefly discuss the popular reception of ideas on several occasions and while his study increasingly crosses class barriers upon reaching the twentieth century, this book is primarily concerned with the ideas of a narrow elite.  While the debates outlined here are fascinating and important, it is highly unlikely that handloom weavers, a group whose fortunes were dramatically and adversely effected by industrialization during the early nineteenth century, sung the praises of parliament or discussed the particulars of John Stuart Mill's effort to found a science of national character as they rested in their hovels at the end of a fourteen-hour day.  At a time when most historians agree that nationalism and national identity was on the ascent, is it reasonable to assume that ordinary workers had no perception of an English national character?  Where they completely excluded from the discussion?

Finally, Mandler's effort to create a more complex language with which to explore questions of identity is an extremely valuable one, but it certainly does not simplify the underlying challenges.  If anything, his book complicates matters tremendously by showing just how transient identities are.  Sense of self and community shifts almost constantly.  Demonstrating this is no bad thing.  Indeed, it is refreshing in a field of study where identity is often viewed as a simple top-down construction.  Yet we are still left with more questions than answers.



2. Interesting Article on Syrian Jews in Brooklyn, New York
The Sy Empire
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/magazine/14syrians-t.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&adxnnlx=1207802757-uVPiedFXSMlesebSFlzppA
by ZEV CHAFETS
Extract:
The Syrian Jews ...arrived in New York at the start of the last century and settled on the Lower East Side of Manhattan. But the Eastern European Jews who dominated the Lower East Side at the time disdained them as Arabische Yidden - Arab Jews. Some of the Ashkenazim openly doubted that these foreigners from farther east were Jews at all. The Syrian Jews were deeply insulted. They are a proud people; community legend boasts that King David built the first synagogue in Aleppo, in what is now Syria. The SY's came to derisively refer to the Ashkenazim as "J-Dubs," a play on the first and third letters of the English word "Jew." As soon as they could, the Syrians moved, en masse, to Brooklyn.




3. Condoleeza Rice Oil Tank Picture- A Fake?
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2008 07:56:39 -0700 (PDT)
From: Michelle Bowie
re Ephraimite Forum-51
#3.  "Counter Conspiracy Theory Suggestions and the Big Oil Money".
Is Big Oil Money behind US Pressure on Israel?
http://www.britam.org/Ephraimite/EF51.html#Counter

The picture of the Chevron oil tanker is a fake. The name of Condoleeza Rice has been superimposed on it. Probably done to send a message, but not real all the same.





Brit-Am Reply:
Wikipedia  (10 April 2008) said:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condoleezza_Rice
<<Rice headed Chevron's committee on public policy until she resigned on January 15, 2001, to become National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush. Chevron honored Rice by naming an oil tanker Condoleezza Rice after her, but controversy led to its being renamed Altair Voyager.[27]

Quoted Source by Wikipedia,
27: Carla Marinucci. Chevron redubs ship named for Bush aide. Condoleezza Rice drew too much attention. San Francisco Chronicle, May 5, 2001. Retrieved February 29, 2008.






To Make an Offering to Brit-Am

Send a check to
Brit-Am
POB 595
Jerusalem 91004
Israel

or deposit a donation in our
PayPal Account
http://britam.org/books.html#donate




Contribute to Brit-Am

Correspond with us
Send Comments or Criticisms
You may not always receive an immediate answer but anything you say will be considered and appreciated
Send us an
 e-mail 

Books and Offering Opportunities

Main Page